A presidential panel studying options for the nation's human space flight program today downplayed launch risk as a significant factor in evaluating the dangers American astronauts will face on future expeditions.The decision to do so ranked all civil government, military and commercial rockets, either existing or in design-and-development, equal in terms of relative risk -- this despite differing levels of complexity and crew safety ratings.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in its final report, said the design of the next crew launch system should "give overriding priority to crew safety" rather than other factors such as low cost, re-usability or advanced space capabilities.
And one panel member said the decision failed to acknowledge the level of crew safety expected from NASA's planned Ares I crew transport rocket. NASA risk assessments have shown the rocket is expected to be twice as safe as existing alternatives and 10 times as safe as the space shuttle.
"I have a little trouble conceding that this should not count," said Bohdan Bejmuk, a former Boeing Co. shuttle program manager and chairman of a standing review board evaluating NASA's moon-Mars program.
"We would quickly find, were we to go down that road and recapitulate three months of work, that simple is in the eye of the beholder," countered Jeff Greason, CEO of XCOR Aerospace, which is developing two manned reusable rocket aircraft.
The Ares I rocket employs a first stage that is a relatively simple five-segment version of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. More than 200 have flown safely since the boosters were redesigned in the wake of the 1986 Challenger accident.
Other liquid-fueled rockets employ engines that operate with high-speed turbomachinery that increases risk.
"It seems to me that (Project Constellation) has a simpler rocket than almost any other rocket and we are not giving it credit," Bejmuk said.
"Well I completely disagree with that assessment, just in passing, but I will not debate it further," Greason said.
The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee was formed in May to conduct an independent analysis of Project Constellation, which is developing Ares rockets and Orion spacecraft for missions to the moon, Mars, and other destinations.
Chaired by former Lockheed Martin CEO Norman Augustine, the 10-member committee of aerospace experts and former astronauts also was asked to review alternative options.
The committee, which delivered an executive summary to the White House Sept. 8, said NASA's moon-Mars program is on "an unsustainable trajectory" and delivered options that would cancel NASA's Ares I crew launcher and instead fly astronauts on commercial rockets.
The 10-member panel of aerospace experts and former astronauts also decided to treat astronaut crew safety as a ’sine qua non’ — a given.
What they mean is that whatever launch vehicle or mission is being pursued, the committee is operating under the assumption that NASA or its private launch-service providers would do their best to protect the astronauts.
Basically, that means the committee ranking system treats all launch vehicles as equals when it comes to safety.
"I think that our going-in position was that it had to be a safe and reliable vehicle from our assessment in order to be considered as an option," said Wanda Austin, president and CEO of The Aerospace Corp., which played a key role in developing the Atlas V and Delta IV "Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles" for the U.S. Air Force.
NASA Project Constellation Manager Jeff Hanley said treating crew safety as a given "is a cop out...plan and simple," in a recent e-mail to Johnson Space Center Director Michael Coats. A copy of the e-mail was obtained by Florida Today.
The Augustine Committee, which was formed in May, is expected to deliver its final report to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy by the end of the month.
8 comments:
Just another factor in considering the panels "True design" by the president.. The tunnel vision framework the panel had to work within "based on the presidents requirements" was in and of itself designed to produce a "certain and specific" result.. and this is just one of the common sence factors that was left out...
I can only assume, since everyone says the president is a smart man, that he and his staff of Cesars wanted to flind an easy way for the president to back out of his promises in manned space flight!! Plain and simple..
When I see all the very smart engineers and managers that know the details of these programs, as well as the one I work on, (shuttle) it is way to obvious that this whole "Blue Ribbon" panel think is nothing but a rouge, a hoax.. another diverson from the truth of this prseident and congress..
I just want to know now where we get our Obama bucks.. and other welfare programs..
Having lost 40% of the shuttles with all aboard and noting that this was NASA's preferred design 35 years ago, give no credibility to NASA whiners arguing for 'their' new rocket as more safe than alternative designs.
The Augustine panel should be discredited immediately. Ares I was born of the need for safety, and anyone dumb enough to think the shuttle offers less risk as time goes on ought to have their head examined. You can't keep driving into your own debris and expect another accident to never happen.
The SRBs have over 200 unit-flights without a failure (remember that Challenger was a management fault). Even a Challenger-like failure on Ares I would be escapable, and the risk of a Columbia-like accident on Ares I is eliminated.
The fact that the SSMEs have never exploded is miraculous, in spite of their 500-second prelaunch test. An SSME failure would likely result in loss of ship and crew. You can't just have all those moving parts without a failure someday. If it happens with the shuttle, then maybe people will wake up.
"Basically, that means the committee ranking system treats all launch vehicles as equals when it comes to safety."
.
as consequence of this choice, the (already largely wrong) A.C. report will be COMPLETELY USELESS !
.
in fact, WHO should say WHICH rocket is better and safer if not a team of TEN aerospace industry's "experts"???
.
WHO should make the "right choice" about this very important point?
.
the (NON-experts of rockets) politics???
.
"An SSME failure would likely result in loss of ship and crew. You can't just have all those moving parts without a failure someday. If it happens with the shuttle, then maybe people will wake up."
.
not true, since an SSME can be always shut-off, if necessary, and that has already happened five times (before T-0) in five on-pad aborted launches, without lose just one Shuttle or astronaut
.
also, the SSMEs are NOT always the same, since they was/are often replaced (when not perfect) with a factory new engine
.
You can't shut off an SSME during the first minute or so of launch, and you can't shut off an SSME if the turbopumps explode. What a spectacle that would be, and not survivable.
Yes, the SSMEs are all tested beforehand, and they routinely swap them out for better or new ones. I'm talking about a failure during the most critical times after launch, not between T-6.6 and T-0.
Just to be fair - the committee did not say that safety is not important, they said it is "a given" which means it is of utmost importance. What they basically said, perhaps they could have done so more clearly, is that they did not have enough information to make any meaningful comments about safety which has an overwhelming number of complicated statistical and engineering variables. Probably they should have just come right out and said that in their report, and recommended that before any final decisions are made a second committee should be formed to evaluate the safety aspects of any options that are being considered.
I agree with Ananymous: "Ares I was born of the need for safety. . . You can't keep driving into your own debris and expect another accident to never happen." Other rockets have their strong points and weaknesses, but NONE of the alternatives to Ares were designed with safety being the #1 priority. Every aspect of the Ares design incorporates decades of lessons learned--resulting in the selection of the proven and indisuptably reliable SRBs, the placement of the crew above and not alongside the rocket motors, and the provision of a means of escape if something goes wrong in the critical early seconds of the launch. This absolutely should have bearing on the choice of architecture for the future. Just ask the crew.
Post a Comment