A government watchdog report released today adds to skepticism that NASA's Constellation program can develop its first post-shuttle rocket on time or on budget. The report supports similar conclusions reached by a presidential panel asked this summer to review NASA's options for human spaceflight.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office report says the Ares I rocket and Orion crew capsule are unlikely to be ready to fly astronauts to the International Space Station on schedule by March 2015.
That would mean a longer gap in launches from Kennedy Space Center if the space shuttle is retired as planned after six more flights.
The report - read it here - also says it is impossible to know how much the rocket's development will cost.
NASA has made progress but "will not be able to reliably estimate the time and money needed to execute the program" without resolving significant technical and design challenges, the report says.
Those challenges, it adds, "are not likely to be overcome in time to meet the 2015 date."
In a response, NASA said it maintains its 2015 goal to fly Ares I, and is addressing all known technical problems.
According to the report, funding shortfalls and cost increases have limited the Constellation program's flexibility to address technical problems as it approaches a key design review in March.
As a result, the agency is "still struggling to develop a solid business case" for implementing the program.
Unveiled in 2005, Constellation includes development of the Ares I launcher, Orion crew capsule, Ares V heavy-lift rocket and Altair lunar lander.
The Obama administration's U.S. Review of Human Space Flight Committee, led by former Lockheed Martin CEO Norm Augustine, also concluded that NASA budgets would not allow a return to the moon until well past the target date of 2020.
Any viable program to explore beyond low Earth orbit by the 2020s would require an extra $3 billion annually, the committee found.
NASA has estimated Constellation will cost over $97 billion through 2020, $49 billion of that for Ares I and Orion.
The GAO report urges NASA to develop a more sound business case before committing to more than the $10 billion in Constellation contracts already obligated.
Recent Constellation program achievements include a successful test firing of the Ares I first stage - a five-segment solid rocket motor - and a preliminary design review for Orion.
And at KSC, workers are preparing to launch the first Ares I test flight on Oct. 27. The Ares I-X rocket is scheduled to roll out to its launch pad Oct. 19.
2 comments:
"The GAO report urges NASA to develop a more sound business case before committing to more than the $10 billion in Constellation contracts already obligated"
NASA developing a business case? Yeah, and that will happen when bats fly out my butt...
I am at a loss to understand how a $360 million "test" flight of Ares 1-X in its planned configuration could have mustered approval.
Although allegedly intended to "test" the rocket's first stage flight control system, parachute recovery system, separation of first & second stages and establish vibration parameters, in reality it tests little more than how fast we can plow through cash.
The Ares first stage is designed for five solid rocket motor segments. The 1-X "test" flight utilizes four actual motor segments and at enormous additional cost, a "simulated" motor segment.
That means the fact-finding "test" flight flies slower and lower which obviously translates to less vibration. Less speed & vibration means less data on actual flight dynamics and structural integrity. Less vibration on a simulated Orion capsule means less data on launch survivability for an eventual crew.
Due to the simulated segment, separation will occur at a much lower altitude, making first stage tumble and chute deployment much less representative of an actual flight.
Testing first and second stage separation adds no value as all subsequently planned Ares flights separate on an all-together different plane.
The first stage flight control system being "tested" is essentially the same one in place for the last 128 Space Shuttle launches. You'd think we'd have a pretty good handle on how it might perform.
There's absolutely no testing of 1-X's second stage flight dynamics as following separation it simply continues on a ballistic arc, crashing into the Atlantic. What can we learn from such a "test" flight?
A very possible revelation is a vehicle with such a high slenderness ratio (14' x 327'), twice that of a Saturn V and almost twice that of a Delta IV, may very well break apart prior to planned first stage separation (ever see high speed video of a javelin in flight?). That is if it doesn't topple over on its unsupported rollout to the pad.
Someone really needs to re-think this.
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